STATE COLLABORATION IN UNITED STATES
RATIFICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
James A.R. Nafziger"
The process in the United States of negotiating and ratifying
human rights treaties seldom engages the states, either individually or
collectively. This has been a strange turn in the evolution of our federal
system that I believe should be of greater interest to human rights
advocates and specialists in foreign relations law. Let me suggest why.
As The Federalist makes clear, the framers of the Constitution
were confident that the Senate, and the Senate alone, would be an ideal
instrument for the expression of state interests in the treaty-making
process.I The Senate was going to be small and its members were to be
elected by state legislatures. It could, therefore, transmit the will of the
states in working closely with the executive branch to make and ratify
treaties. Moreover, it was expected that the Senators would be among the
most able, virtuous, and therefore trustworthy citizens of the various
states.'
How times have changed over the past two centuries! The role of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the powers and paternalism of its
Chairman, and a routinely clumsy handling of foreign affairs would have
been beyond the imagination of even the remarkably imaginative Founding
Fathers. Nor was their intent to vest a determination of state interests
exclusively within the discretion of a handful of Senators. The states,
themselves, through a plenary Senate, were to decide collectively what,
within constitutional limits, was in their interest. In effect, it was the states
*

Thomas B. Stoel Professor of Law, Willamette University College of Law. The author

appreciates the insights and suggestions of his colleagues Claudia Burton and Hans Linde.
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 354 (Alexander Hamilton) (Goldwin Smith ed., 1901).
See also TREATIES AND OTHER AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE: A
STUDY PREPARED FOR THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE
xxxii, S. Print 103-53, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter Treaties Study].
2.
As the select assemblies for choosing the President, as well as the state
legislatures who appoint the Senators, will in general be composed of the most
enlightened and respectable citizens, there is reason to presume that their attention and
their votes will be directed to those men who have become the most distinguished by
their abilities and virtue, and in whom the people perceive just grounds for confidence.
The Constitution manifests very particular attention to this object.
THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 354, supra note 1.
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that were to advise the President on international agreements and consent

to their ratification.,
Surely the states have always had fundamental interests in the
codification and progressive development of human rights. In the words
of The Federalist, "[t]he powers reserved to the several States will extend
to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the
lives, liberties, and properties of the people and the internal order,
improvement, and prosperity of the State." 4 A little later, the Tenth
Amendment, in effect, confirmed these powers.' Today, the states, subject
to the United States Constitution and civil rights laws, are where much of
the action is.6 It is to state government, in the words of The Federalist,
that "the first and most natural attachment of the people will be.",
Senator John Bricker knew that. Senator Jesse Helms knows that.
Both of those powerful adversaries of human rights treaties have known
that to a serious fault. Why don't the states themselves get the message?
Why don't they become more involved in the process of ratifying human
3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. ("[The President] shall have power, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the senators present concur.")
4. THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 256 (James Madison), supra note 1.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. X. ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the
people. ")
6. Consider that state, not national, laws govern our most important social
relationships. Marriage, divorce, and parenthood are matters of state law. State courts
applying state law decide deeply human and moral disputes - - whether a hospital may
discontinue life support for a hopelessly ill patient or force treatment for a child over
the parent's religious objections, for example, or whether a child should live with a
father or with a surrogate mother who has changed her mind about her surrogate status
- - issues of personal rights more meaningful to many people than freedom of the press
or the Fifth Amendment protections against self-incrimination or double jeopardy.
Property ownership, inheritance, and the use of land are governed by state law. So are
buying and selling, employment, and other contracts. So is compensation for personal
injuries. Workers' compensation laws were enacted by state legislatures, and battles
over tort liability and insurance coverage are won and lost there as well. The states,
not Congress, decide who may practice law or medicine, be a plumber or a.
hairdresser, drive a car or buy a drink.
The mass of conventional crimes are defined by state laws, and the overwhelming
majority of criminal cases are investigated by local police officers and prosecuted by
states' attorneys in state courts. Decentralized police power and the limited functions
and small number of federal law enforcement officials are crucial protections of liberty
in a federal system. Consider also that, second only to law enforcement, our most
important and largest social service, education, is provided by state and local schools
and colleges or governed by state laws.
Hans A. Linde, Citizenship and State Constitutions, in ROOTS, RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
386-87 (A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1992).
7.

THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 258 (James Madison), supra note 1.
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rights treaties? Of course, many human rights advocates might shudder at
the suggestion: The last thing we need is the ghost of the Bricker
Amendment' come alive. Let's not give the states any more ideas about
how they can puncture the Commonweal. What's more, state and local
governments claim that they lack resources. They will therefore do
anything to avoid new obligations. Worse yet, local police and district
attorneys are out to suppress, not expand, human rights. And what about
Proposition 187? 9 After all, that was the people of California speaking
directly. The less we hear from the states, the better.
Despite the risks, however, I would argue that fuller and more
direct collaboration by the states in the treaty making process would
strengthen and perhaps accelerate our national commitment to the
conventional regime of human rights. Such collaboration would make it
more likely that the states would promote ratification and implement
human rights treaties, even if they are not self-executing. The political
branches of the federal government need to enter into a more direct,
educational dialogue with the states. The Meiklejohn Civil Liberties
Institute, in a letter to the United Nations Human Rights Committee
concerning Proposition 187,10 questioned United States implementation of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Three out of
seven questions raised by the Institute in their letter highlighted the need to
educate state authorities on their responsibilities under the Covenant."
Greater collaboration by the State of California in ratifying the Covenant
might well have weakened some of the appeal to California political

8.
The Bricker Amendment, rooted in a fear of human rights treaties, would have
provided, inter alia, against self-execution of treaties and international supervision of any matters
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of states. Hearingson S. R. Res. I and S. J. Res. 43,

Treaties and Executive Agreements, Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on
ConstitutionalAmendments, S. REP. No. 2-3, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1953) [hereinafter Senate
Judiciary Committee Hearings]. See Natalie Hevener Kaufman & David Whiteman, Opposition
to Human Rights Treaties in The United States Senate: The Legacy of the Bricker Amendment, 10
HUM. RTS. Q. 309 (1988).
9.
Proposition 187, which California voters approved in November 1994, denies access
by undocumented aliens to publicly funded social services, nonemergency health care, and
education. Codified at CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 43215, 66010.8 (West Supp. 1995); CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 130 (West Supp. 1995); CAL. WELFARE & INST. CODE § 10001.5 (West
Supp. 1995) [hereinafter Proposition 187].
10.

Proposition 187, supra note 9.
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Treaties and the Fight Against Proposition 187, 17 CHICANO LATINO L. REV. 88, 98-99 (1995).
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leaders of Proposition 187,12 for example. And when we look at what,
really, we have accomplished in more than a symbolic sense by our.
heavily qualified ratification of a limited number of human rights treaties
during the past fifty years, the probable benefits of more direct state
involvement in the treaty-making process would seem to outweigh the
costs or risks. It is at least worth a try.
We should not forget that state constitutions and laws are Often out
in front of corresponding federal provisions. Consider just a few examples
from three states with which I am most familiar: Oregon, Washington,
and California. One judicial decision has gone beyond Title IX of the
14
Federal Civil Rights Act" in eliminating gender discrimination in sports.
Another simply made gender a suspect classification for judicial scrutiny.'
Still another rejected polygraph tests as a condition for public employment
of persons not involved in public safety. 6 Courts have allowed medical
patients to terminate life sustaining equipment or treatment," and voters in
one of the three states approved of a ballot measure that provided for
physician assisted suicide."8 Even if California's notorious Proposition
187' 9 spoils this record, we should note that California's next-door
neighbor has prohibited state and local law enforcement officials from
assisting the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in rounding up
undocumented aliens.m
These actions are just a few examples of state leadership in
promoting and protecting human rights. They are, of course, controversial
and far from universal actions among the states. The point is, however,
that states can be on the vanguard of championing human rights." Indeed,
there has been a trend toward the use of state courts to implement human
rights under state laws and constitutions rather than federal constitutional

12.

Proposition 187, supra note 9.

13. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) ("No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.")
14. Darrin v. Gould, 540 P.2d 882 (Wash. 1975).

15.

Hewitt v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 653 P.2d 970 (Or. 1982).

16. Long Beach City Emp. v. City of Long Beach, 719 P.2d 660 (Cal. 1986).

17. In re Guardianship of Grant, 747 P.3d 445 (Wash. 1987); Matter of Welfare of Colyer,
660 P.2d 738 (Wash. 1983).

18. Death With Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 (1995).
19. Proposition 187, supra note 9.

20. E.g., 38 Or. Op. Att'y Gen. 759 (1977).
21. See generally, Judith Avner, Some Observations on State Equal Rights Amendments, 3
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 144 (1984).
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provisions. Moreover, state courts in the three-state region have had the
courage and wisdom to cite international instruments in recent decisions. 22
That should remind us that customary human rights law is made not
"merely by national governmental actors within a federal system.",,
Whether states are more progressive or retrograde in promoting human
rights is not the most important point. What matters most is that, although
state and local governments deal with human rights around the clock, they
are not playing a direct enough role in advising the federal government on
instruments that ultimately rely on implementation by all three levels of
government.
I contacted several leading associations of state and local
governments to see if this was true. The National Association of Attorneys
General reported that they had been involved in the making of only a
single treaty, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
because of their concern that it might preempt states' rights. They were
not, however, involved in drafting NAFTA's side agreement on labor
rights.2
The National Governors' Association noted they had been a
leading force in support of NAFTA, but that they never "get involved," in
their words, with any human rights treaties., 5 Neither the Democratic
Governors Association nor the Republican Governors Association assigns
staff members to follow treaty developments.-6 Perhaps the most striking
comment was made to me by the United States Conference of Mayors.
They reported that they normally deal only with "urban" as opposed to
"national" issues. Because they have classified human rights treaties as
national rather than urban, they have chosen not to be involved in the

treaty-making process .17
The underlying message of this very limited survey may be that
human rights treaties are too arcane, too remote, or too trivial for busy
state and local governments. Another message may be that state and local
authorities rely, quite reasonably in theory, on their United States Senators
22.
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citing, e.g., Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123 (Or. 1981);
American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Fair Emp. & Hous. Comm'n, 651 P.2d 1151 (Cal. 1982).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 11 (1985),

23. Jordan J. Paust, The Complex Nature, Sources and Evidences of Customary Human
Rights, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 147, 158 (1995/96).

24. Telephone Interview with Paul Beaulieu, Deputy Director and General Counsel, Nat'l
Ass'n of Att'ys Gen. (Oct. 10, 1996).
25. Telephone Interview with Jim Martin, Director, Office of State and Federal Affairs,
Nat'l Governors' Ass'n (Oct. 3, 1996).
26. Taped telephone messages from Democratic and Republican Governors Ass'n (Oct. 5,
1996).
27.
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to do the job.
Or, perhaps, governments presume that human rights
treaties have only symbolic value by confirming the Federal Bill of Rights.
Because human rights treaties, therefore, are thought to pose little or no
risk to the nation,2 9 they are not worthy of much attention. To the extent
treaty provisions may exceed constitutional protections, the Chairman of
the Foreign Relations Committee can be counted on to fend off any
unwarranted international intrusion.
The states have therefore been missing in action during the great
battles over human rights. On the other hand, a private body, the
American Bar Association (ABA), has been able to deploy its forces very
effectively. The saga of ABA obstructionism during the first twenty-five
or thirty years of the modern human rights era is well known. 0
Apparently the ABA feared that the President, conniving with the Senate
behind the backs of the states, would accomplish by treaty what the
Congress for many years had refused to enact, namely, civil rights
legislation. What is more, the long-time Chairman of the ABA Section on
International Law, Eberhard Deutsch, adamantly opposed human rights
treaties not only as a threat to states' rights but as a device, in his words,
to destroy local government. 31 Perhaps his New Orleans background led
him to fear a sort of French-style system of prefects serving only the
interests of the nation. Deutsch used this premise to launch a broader
attack on the treaty clause of the Constitution? 2 He described it as a
"'Trojan Horse,' ready to unload its hidden soldiery into our midst,
destroying State laws and constitutions and leaving behind the wreckage of
the dream of the Founding Fathers which envisioned maintenance of the
established constitutional balance between State and Federal power, and
28. After all, "in an impressive number of instances," both the Senate and the House of
Representatives have been involved in the negotiation process leading to conclusion of a treaty.
Anne M. Williams, United States Treaty Law, in THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW, U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 40 (Hurst

Hannum & Dana D. Fischer eds., 1993).
29.
(1981).

RICHARD B. BILDER, MANAGING THE RISKS OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT 13

30. For a chronicle of the ABA's opposition to human rights treaties, see NATALIE
HEVENER KAUFMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE SENATE:
A HISTORY OF
OPPOSITION, passim (1990). "States' rights were ardently defended and often presented as the
only bulwark against an expansive federal government that would use its powers to impose a host

of liberal programs on states and local communities, programs such as the elimination of racial
restrictions on property ownership, marriage, and education." Id. at 12.
31. Id. at 115-16. In Deutsch's words, "[guilding of multipartite treaties with such
idealistic immediate goals as the prevention of genocide and the promotion of human rights
cannot conceal their underlying long-range objective to destroy local government while expanding
the sphere of national power." Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings, supra note 8, at 145.
32. Id.
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preservation of the Bill of Rights intact."" The ABA has, of course,
changed its mind. Since it began to support human rights treaties in the
1970s, the ABA has played a constructive role in the process of ratifying
them. But it is not a role that can ever replace the states.
The perceived importance of states' rights in the treaty-making
process is clear from a statistical profile of arguments made against human
rights treaties?' Moreover, the trend is toward greater reliance on the
states' rights argument to oppose human rights treaties." It is ironic that
precisely because "human rights fall in the domain of states' rights," 3 , the
Senate, without bothering to consult the states directly or to solicit their
testimony, has an excuse for refusing to ratify a treaty that might serve
their interests or for nonaction." The question, however, should be about
human rights and not states' rights. It should not be a question of what a
few Senators perceive states' rights to be, as a technique for blocking
human rights treaties. Instead, the question should be how to involve the
states in a fuller, more open dialogue about the human rights with which
they are concerned on a daily basis.
It is high time, therefore, that we reinvigorate the states' role at the
federal level in the ratification process, as the Framers of the Constitution
intended. We need to stir up a sluggish process. "[Clurrent opposition to

33. Id. at 119.
34. Kaufman & Whiteman, supra note 8, at 33 1.
35. For example, between 1953 and 1979 there was a reported increase of nearly fifty
percent in the percentage of total arguments against human rights treaties (16.8% to 23.4%).
36. Kaufman & Whiteman, supra note 8, at 313.
37. Of course, the reasons for the poor record of the United States in acceding to human
rights treaties extend beyond the issues of states' rights:
Although the United States has been in the vanguard of observance of human rights,
the issue of entering into legally binding human rights treaties has been controversial.
While sometimes there is a difference on the nature of human rights to be guaranteed,
often the controversy has extended to treaties guaranteeing human rights on which
there is wide agreement. Various administration officials and Senators have contended
that human rights should remain a matter of domestic jurisdiction and have expressed
concern that internationally determined human rights could have an impact on rights of
American citizens under the U.S. Constitution. They feared that since in the United
States treaties are the law of the land, human rights treaties could supersede national
and state laws. Other administration officials and Senators emphasized the value of the
conventions in promoting human rights in other countries and believed that the United
States should become a party to maintain its leadership in the human rights fields.
They contended the United States usually had a higher standard of human rights than
called for in the treaties, and in any event no international agreement could supersede
rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
TREATIES STUDY, supra note 1, at 231.
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human rights treaties is a legacy of the 1950's."I' Enlisting greater state
collaboration would, of course, impose burdens on the human rights
movement. We can expect, for example, that states, individually or
collectively, would oppose as well as support ratifications. But that is
democracy and the federal system at work. And who knows? Broader
collaboration might help convert skeptical state authorities. It might also
39
diminish the significance of federal-state clauses in human rights treaties
and the appeal of reservations to them on the basis of so-called states'
rights. We might then avoid some of the Swiss cheese effect of this
country's treaty commitments to the international protection of human
rights.

38.

KAUFMAN, supra note 30, at 2.

39.

Id. at 171.

